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Indigenous Peoples’ Participation Rights within
International Law
Tara Ward
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

¶3

The right to free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) in relation to development projects,
resource extraction, and other investment projects within the territory of indigenous peoples is
currently being debated within international law. On a basic level, the concept of FPIC is
contained within its phrasing: it is the right of indigenous peoples to make free and informed
choices about the development of their lands and resources. The basic principles of FPIC are to
ensure that indigenous peoples are not coerced or intimidated, that their consent is sought and
freely given prior to the authorisation or start of any activities, that they have full information
about the scope and impacts of any proposed developments, and that ultimately their choices to
give or withhold consent are respected.1
This article explores the development of FPIC within international law. It does so by
examining the development of indigenous peoples’ rights of participation, consultation, and
consent within international law, and asks whether these rights represent a customary
international legal principle as of yet. It then applies these standards to two distinct cases. The
first is the case of the Lubicon Cree in Northern Alberta, Canada, which revolves around a
historic land claim dispute. Ultimately, the lack of clarity regarding the status of their rights to
land has severely limited the ability of the Lubicon Cree to exercise their participation rights.
The second case is that of the Mayan communities of Sipacapa and San Miguel Ixtahuacan,
Guatemala, and the development of a gold mine within their territory. The Mayan communities
have clearly articulated their struggle as the failure of both the company involved and the
Guatemalan government to effectively consult them prior to the granting of either the exploration
or exploitation licenses. These cases are in distinct political, social, judicial, and legislative
contexts, but together provide insight into the challenges that exist for indigenous peoples in
exercising their participation rights.
This article finds that although a customary international legal principle that addresses
indigenous peoples’ full right to FPIC does not yet exist, there is a clear consensus within
international human rights jurisprudence that at a minimum States must engage in good faith

Tara Ward has an L.L.M in Human Rights from the University of East London, a Masters of Education in Studies
in Lifelong Learning from Mount Saint Vincent University, and a Bachelor in Environmental Studies from York
University. She has worked extensively in support of human rights defenders with Peace Brigades International and
her research interests revolve around the framework for business and human rights with a particular focus on the
extractive industries.
1 U.N. Comm’n. on Human Rights, Sub-Comm. on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights Working Group
on Indigenous Populations, Working Paper: Standard-Setting: Legal Commentary on the Concept of Free, Prior
and Informed Consent, ¶ 57, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/2005/WP.1, 2005 (July 14, 2005) (prepared by
Antoanella-Iulia Motoc and the Tebtebba Foundation).
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consultations with indigenous peoples prior to the exploration or exploitation of resources within
their lands or actions that would impact their traditionally used resources. Even with this
minimal consensus, however, this article demonstrates the size of the gap that exists between the
developing international norms and States’ practice. Finally, the discussion of the jurisprudence
and the analysis of the two case studies highlight that, for the affected communities, FPIC and
other participation rights are not merely administrative processes, but are an exercise in and
expression of the right to self-determination.
II. FREE, PRIOR, AND INFORMED CONSENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
¶4

¶5

For indigenous rights advocates, free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) and other
participation rights are derived from the right to self-determination, which is considered to be the
founding principle of indigenous peoples’ rights.2 Given the fact that the concept of selfdetermination has historically been connected to the process of decolonisation and the secession
of peoples from States, the development of an effective legal argument for indigenous peoples’
rights to self-determination has been challenging within international law.3 However, modern
conceptions of self-determination, particularly for indigenous peoples, do not necessarily include
the right to separate from a State, but rather “a range of alternatives including the right to
participate in the governance of the State as well as the right to various forms of autonomy and
self-governance.”4
Scholars argue that the right to self-determination is clearly articulated in Common Article
1 of both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which states that: “[a]ll peoples
have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”5 As such, groups or
communities of indigenous peoples, as peoples, have the right to self-determination.6 It is further
argued that in order to be meaningful, self-determination must include economic selfdetermination, which ultimately involves the control over traditional lands, territories and
resources.7 As an extension of these rights, indigenous peoples must have the right to grant or
withhold consent to certain development projects within their lands, and which impact their
resources.8
2

Bartolome Clavero, The Indigenous Rights of Participation and International Development Policies, 22 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 41, 42 (2005); Katsuhiko Masaki, Recognition or Misrecognition? Pitfalls of Indigenous Peoples
Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC), in RIGHTS-BASED APPROACHES TO DEVELOPMENT: EXPLORING THE
POTENTIAL PITFALLS 69 (2009); U.N. Comm’n. on Human Rights, supra note 1, at 56.
3 Megan Davis, Indigenous Struggles in Standard-Setting: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, 9 MELB. J. INT’L L. 439, 458-59 (2008).
4 Erica-Irene A. Daes, Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Indigenous Peoples: Indigenous Peoples’ Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Final
Report of the Special Rapporteur, United Nations, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/30, at 17 (2004).
5 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1978) [hereinafter ICCPR];
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (1967) [hereinafter
ICESCR].
6 United Nations Comm’n on Human Rights, supra note 1, at 10.
7 Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 4, ¶ 17; Lisl Brunner, The Rise of Peoples'
Rights in the Americas: The Saramaka People Decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 7 CHINESE J.
INT’L L. 699, 708 (2008).
8 Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 4, ¶ 38; U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights,
supra note 1, at 10.
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While for indigenous rights advocates self-determination is the basis for FPIC, within
international human rights jurisprudence FPIC is legally based in property rights, cultural rights,
and the right to non-discrimination. Most clearly, FPIC has been articulated in the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (U.N. Declaration).9 Within other
international instruments and jurisprudence, there appears to be a debate as to whether the right
of participation is a right to be consulted or whether it is the right to give or withhold consent
over certain development projects.10 In order to examine whether FPIC is an existing customary
international legal principle or merely a norm in development, we must explore its development
within international law, specifically within the context of the United Nations system, the
International Labour Organisation Treaty system, and the Inter-American Human Rights system.
A. United Nations Treaties Supervisory Bodies

¶7

¶8

The Human Rights Committee (HRC) has examined the right of participation of
indigenous peoples with relation to their traditional lands, territories, and resources under Article
27 of the ICCPR. This Article addresses the rights of ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities to
their culture and states that “persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and
practise their own religion, or to use their own language.”11 In General Comment No. 23, the
HRC has interpreted Article 27 with regard to the rights of indigenous peoples to include the
protection of a way of life that is connected to the control over, and use of, lands and resources.12
Further, the HRC states that with regard to the cultures of indigenous peoples and the use of their
traditional lands and resources, Article 27 includes the positive duty of the State to “ensure the
effective participation of members of minority communities in decisions which affect them.”13
The HRC has used this interpretation to consistently call on States Parties in its concluding
observations to respect their duty to consult with indigenous peoples prior to any economic
development or granting of any resource concessions within their traditional lands or territories.14
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the supervisory body
of the ICESCR, has specifically referred to the participation rights of indigenous communities in
relation to land and resource rights as requiring consultation with the goal of obtaining consent in
its concluding observations to both Colombia and Ecuador.15 Most recently, the CESCR has
9

United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Sept. 13, 2007, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/295 (2007) [hereinafter United Nations Declaration].
10 S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples' Participatory Rights in Relation to Decisions about Natural Resource
Extraction: The More Fundamental Issue of What Rights Indigenous Peoples Have in Lands and Resources, 22
ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 7 (2005).
11 ICCPR supra note 5, art. 27.
12 U.N. High Comm’r. for Human Rights, General Comment No. 23: The rights of minorities (Art. 27), ¶ 3.2, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5 (Apr. 8, 1994).
13 Id. ¶ 7.
14 See, e.g., U.N. High Comm’r. for Human Rights, Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee:
Chile, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/CHL/CO/5 (March 12-30, 2007); U.N. High Comm’r. for Human Rights,
Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Panama, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/PAN/CO/3 (Apr. 17,
2008); U.N. High Comm’r. for Human Rights, Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee:
Nicaragua, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/NIC/CO/3 (Dec. 12, 2008).
15 U.N. High Comm’r. for Human Rights, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [CESCR],
Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Colombia, ¶ 12 and 33, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.74 (Dec. 6, 2007); CESCR, Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: Ecuador, ¶ 12 and 35, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.100 (June 7, 2004).
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further expanded on the right of indigenous peoples to FPIC in General Comment No. 21.16 This
interpretation of Article 15 of ICESCR, which outlines the right to participate in cultural life,
includes the rights of indigenous peoples to restitution or return of lands, territories and resources
traditionally used and enjoyed by indigenous communities if taken without the prior and
informed consent of the affected peoples.17 Further, it calls on States Parties to the Convention
to “respect the principle of free, prior, and informed consent of indigenous peoples in all matters
covered by their specific rights.”18 The CESCR clearly recognises indigenous peoples’
collective rights to lands and resources through their right to participate in and maintain their
cultures.
¶9
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) also calls not just for
consultation, but also informed consent with its interpretation of the rights of indigenous peoples
in applying the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD).19 In General Recommendation No. 23, CERD requires States Parties
to ensure that indigenous peoples have equal rights to participate in public life and that no
decisions relating directly to indigenous peoples are to be taken without their informed consent.20
With specific reference to land and resource rights, CERD calls for restitution in situations where
decisions have already been taken without the prior and informed consent of the affected
indigenous peoples.21 CERD has used this General Recommendation in its concluding
observations, requiring States Parties to ensure consultation and ultimately the consent of
indigenous peoples with regard to development and resource exploitation within their traditional
lands and territories.22 Ultimately, CERD has used the framework of protecting indigenous
peoples from discrimination and upholding the right to equality, in order to promote their
participation rights and ultimately the right to FPIC.
¶10
It should be emphasised that the concluding observations to States Parties and general
comments or recommendations on the application of a treaty by the U.N. Treaty Supervisory
bodies are not legally binding decisions.23 They are interpretations of how a State Party should
apply a treaty in order to fulfill its international obligations. Even though there does appear to be
a minimal consensus amongst the supervisory bodies in relation to the right of indigenous
peoples to be consulted in regard to development projects, these recommendations do not
represent legally binding obligations and this limits their impact on the development of a
customary international legal norm.
16

CESCR, General comment No. 21 Right of everyone to take part in cultural life (art. 15, ¶ 1 (a), of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/21 (Dec. 21, 2009).
17 Id. ¶ 36.
18 Id. ¶ 37.
19 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S.
195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter ICERD].
20 U.N. Comm’n. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination: Annex V - General Recommendation XXIII, ¶ 4(d), U.N. Doc. Supplement No. 18 (A/52/18) (Sept.
26, 1997).
21 Id. ¶ 5.
22 See, e.g., U.N. Comm’n. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding observations of the Committee
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Ecuador, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/ECU/CO/19 (Sept. 22, 2008); U.N.
Comm’n. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding observations of the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Namibia, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/NAM/CO/12 (Sept. 22, 2008); U.N.
Comm’n. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding observations of the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination: USA, ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/USA/CO/6 (May 8, 2008).
23 Michael O'Flaherty, The Concluding Observations of United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 6 HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 27, 33 (2006).
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B. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
¶11

The U.N. Declaration is the result of two decades of advocacy and negotiations by
indigenous peoples’ rights advocates,24 and most clearly articulates free, prior, and informed
consent (FPIC) in relation to self-determination rather than as a derivative right to culture or the
right to non-discrimination. The Declaration as a whole is based upon the principle of indigenous
peoples’ right to self-determination and that “[b]y virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”25 It is argued
that the subsequent and more operative articles of the Declaration outline what selfdetermination would look like in practice.26 In this vein, the U.N. Declaration explicitly calls for
the FPIC of indigenous peoples in: Article 10 in the case of relocation of indigenous
communities, Article 19 when a State is adopting legislative or administrative measures that
affect indigenous peoples, and Article 29 regarding the disposal of hazardous waste within their
territories.27 In addition, Article 32 requires free and informed consent prior to “the approval of
any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with
the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.”28
¶12
During the negotiations of the U.N. Declaration, participation rights were some of the most
contentious in large part because of the ambiguity of the definition.29 For some indigenous rights
advocates FPIC is seen as a right to veto projects, while others argue that FPIC is not meant to be
a veto right, but rather a way of ensuring that indigenous peoples meaningfully participate in
decisions directly impacting their lands, territories, and resources.30 What is clear is that FPIC
within the U.N. Declaration is conceived of as a way to ensure that the right to self-determination
is respected and protected by States.
¶13
It should be noted that the U.N. Declaration is not a binding legal instrument and is
ultimately considered as an instrument of soft law.31 Some argue that it represents and affirms
existing customary international law.32 Others argue that it is not completely accurate to suggest
that the Declaration already represents emerging customary international law.33 The idea behind
a Declaration and other non-binding instruments is that they create norms that can guide the
behaviour of States and ultimately this behaviour can develop into customary international law.34
What is clear is that the text of the Declaration is well informed by international law, and appears
to represent the interpretations of the U.N. human rights supervisory bodies on their respective

24

S. James Anaya, The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination in the Post-Declaration Era, in MAKING
184
(Claire Charters & Rodolfo Stavenhagen eds., 2009); Davis, supra note 3, at 440.
25 United Nations Declaration, supra note 9, art. 3.
26 Davis, supra note 3, at 461.
27 United Nations Declaration, supra note 9, art. 32(2).
28 Id.
29 Davis, supra note 3, at 465.
30 Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil,
Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development: Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, ¶ 48, UN Doc.
A/HRC/12/34 (July 15, 2009) (by S. James Anaya); Davis, supra note 3, at 465.
31 Davis, supra note 3, at 465.
32 Anaya, supra note 24; Clavero, supra note 2, at 43.
33 Davis, supra note 3, at 465; Alexandra Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights in International Law over the Last 10 Years
and Future Developments, 10 MELB. J. INT’L L. 27, 36 (2009).
34 Anaya, supra note 24, at 184; Davis, supra note 3, at 440.
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treaties in relation to indigenous peoples rights.35 The Declaration is referred to as an
international standard by other U.N. human rights bodies, within the Inter-American System,36
and by at least one national Supreme Court.37 Such recognition for the Declaration, although
building up slowly, will hopefully transform itself into State practice and stronger enforcement
of the rights contained within the Declaration. At the very least, the Declaration augments
indigenous peoples’ rights within international law and contributes to the development of
indigenous peoples’ participation rights and helps to slide the scale towards a duty of obtaining
consent, rather than mere consultation.
C. International Labour Organisation Treaties
¶14

The International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention concerning the Protection and
Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent
Countries (ILO Convention No. 107)38 was the first international treaty that created binding
obligations for States regarding indigenous people.39 Although the treaty is no longer open for
ratification, it is still binding over seventeen States.40 The treaty, however, is considered
problematic given that it was clearly developed with a State-centric view of development, and
was aimed at the assimilation of indigenous peoples.41 The only provision that recognises the
participation rights of indigenous peoples is in relation to the relocation of indigenous
communities. Article 12, Convention No. 107 clearly requires the free consent of the affected
indigenous communities, but then places restrictions on this right by allowing States to
subordinate the right of consent if the relocation is in accordance with national laws, in the
interest of national security, or the interest of national economic development.42 Ultimately, the
Convention severely limits the right to give or withhold consent by allowing States to ignore
these rights using the excuses historically invoked to remove indigenous peoples from their
lands.43
¶15
The Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO
Convention No. 169)44 was negotiated with the intent of replacing ILO Convention No. 107, and
made some significant improvements. These include using the term “indigenous peoples” rather
than “indigenous populations,”45 recognizing the communal land rights of indigenous
35

Xanthaki, supra note 33.
Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Cost, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 174, ¶ 131 and 136 (Nov. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Saramaka People v. Suriname].
37 Maia S. Campbell & S. James Anaya, The Case of the Maya Villages of Belize: Reversing the Trend of
Government Neglect to Secure Indigenous Land Rights, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 377, 379 (2008).
38 International Labour Organisation (ILO), Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous
and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries (ILO No. 107), adopted June 26, 1957,
entered into force June 2, 1959, 328 U.N.T.S. 247 [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 107].
39 ALEXANDRA XANTHAKI, INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND UNITED NATIONS STANDARDS: SELF-DETERMINATION,
CULTURE AND LAND, 49 (2007).
40 Angola, Bangladesh, Belgium, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti,
India, Iraq, Malawi, Pakistan, Panama, Syrian Arab Republic, and Tunisia. List of States that have ratified,
denounced, or declared the ILO Convention No. 107 inapplicable, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgilex/ratifce.pl?C107.
41 XANTHAKI, supra note 39, at 51.
42 ILO Convention No. 107, supra note 38, art. 12(1).
43 XANTHAKI, supra note 39, at 63.
44 ILO, Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO Doc. 169), adopted
June 27, 1989, entered into force September 5, 1991, 28 I.L.M. 1382, [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 169].
45 Id. art. 1.
36
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communities,46 and recognizing the rights of indigenous peoples to their natural resources.47 The
Convention is still controversial given that indigenous peoples were not involved in the
negotiation of the text.48
¶16
Even with the controversies, the Convention and its application by the Committee of
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) have placed the
participation rights of indigenous peoples at the forefront. The Convention specifically outlines
the participation rights of indigenous peoples with regard to the implementation of the
Convention itself in Articles 6 and 7. These provisions require that consultations undertaken in
the application of the Convention must be, “in good faith and in a form appropriate to the
circumstances, with the objective of achieving agreement or consent to the proposed
measures.”49 It is argued that these two articles “reflect the spirit of prior informed consent and
apply to each provision of ILO 169.”50 The Convention further outlines the right to consultation
prior to the exploration or exploitation of resources,51 the need for free informed consent of
indigenous peoples prior to any relocation,52 and the requirement to consult with indigenous
peoples prior to any transfer of land rights outside of their community.53
¶17
Participation rights have been the foundation of the CEACR interpretations of how the
Convention applies to States Parties. For example, a Committee established to examine
Ecuador’s non-compliance with the Convention stated that “the spirit of consultation and
participation constitutes the cornerstone of ILO Convention No. 169 on which all its provisions
are based.” 54 Further the CEACR stated that it:
cannot over-emphasize the importance of ensuring the right of indigenous and
tribal peoples to decide their development priorities through meaningful and
effective consultation and participation of these peoples at all stages of the
development process, and particularly when development models and priorities
are discussed and decided.55
¶18

The CEACR has repeatedly called on States Parties to respect their obligations to consult
with indigenous peoples prior to exploration and exploitation of natural resources within their
traditional territories, and has insisted on the adoption and implementation of domestic
legislation in order to facilitate such consultations.56 Again in interpreting the Convention, the
46

Id. art. 13.
Id. art. 15.
48 Clavero, supra note 2, at 46.
49 ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 44, art. 6(2).
50 David C. Baluarte, Balancing Indigenous Rights and a State's Right to Develop in Latin America: The InterAmerican Rights Regime and ILO Convention 169, 4 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 9, 10 (2004).
51 ILO Convention No.169, supra note 44, art. 15(2).
52 Id. art. 16(2).
53 Id. art. 17(2).
54 ILO, Report of the Committee set up to examine the representation alleging non-observance by Ecuador of the
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution by the
Confederación Ecuatoriana de Organizaciones Sindicales Libres (CEOSL), ILO Doc. GB.277/18/4, GB.282/14/2
(Nov. 14, 2001).
55 International Labour Conference, 98th Session, 2009, General Observation concerning Convention No. 169, in
Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, at 672 (2009).
56 See, e.g., CEACR. Individual Observation concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169)
Ecuador, ILO Doc. 062010ECU169, ¶ 4 (2010); CEACR, Individual Observation concerning Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169) Guatemala, ILO Doc. 062006GTM169, ¶¶ 10, 13, and 15 (2006); CEACR,
47
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CEACR does not have a way to enforce its recommendations,57 and the communications
mechanism of the CEACR is not a judicial remedy. Furthermore, the impact of ILO Convention
No. 169 in developing a customary legal norm is limited given that it has only been ratified by
and is only binding upon 20 states.58
D. Inter-American Human Rights System
¶19

The Inter-American Human Rights System has developed an advanced and substantive
body of jurisprudence on the rights of indigenous peoples.59 The Inter-American System has
recognised the collective rights of indigenous peoples to land, rights to the natural resources
traditionally used and found within their territories, and ultimately to FPIC with regard to any
large-scale development projects that impact their survival as indigenous peoples. The right to
full FPIC has been a slow-developing norm within the Inter-American System and has been
articulated through several landmark cases before both the Inter-American Commission of
Human Rights (Commission) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Court). This body
of jurisprudence has been developed around the rights to property, culture, and judicial
protection60 as outlined by the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (American
Declaration),61 and the American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention).62 It
should be noted that although the American Declaration is not a legally binding document, it is
interpreted as a source of international legal obligations for member States of the Organisation of
American States (OAS) by both the Commission and the Court.63 The American Convention,
however, is a legally binding treaty, and the rulings of the Court are considered to be binding on
States Parties who have recognised the jurisdiction of the Court.
¶20
The case of Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua examined the fact that
the Nicaraguan government had issued various logging concessions to foreign companies within
territory traditionally used and occupied by the Awas Tingni Community.64 Ultimately, the
Court found that Nicaragua had violated the rights of the Awas Tingni to judicial protection of
Article 25 and the right to property of Article 21 of the American Convention. Specifically, the
Court found that Nicaragua had violated the right to judicial protection by not having an
Individual Observation concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169) Mexico, ILO Doc.
062006MEX169, ¶ 10 (2006).
57 Shin Imai, Ladan Mehravar & Jennifer Sander, Breaching Indigenous Law: Canadian Mining in Guatemala, 6
INDIGENOUS L. J. 101, 130 (2007).
58 XANTHAKI, supra note 39, at 91.
59 Baluarte, supra note 50, at 9; Enzamaria Tramontana, The Contribution of the Inter-American Human Rights
Bodies to Evolving International Law on Indigenous Rights over Lands and Natural Resources, 17 INT’L J. MINOR
GROUP RTS. 241, 242 (2010); Xanthaki, supra note 33, at 32.
60 Alex Page, Indigenous Peoples' Free Prior and Informed Consent in the Inter-American Human Rights System, 4
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 16, 16 (2004).
61 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, reprinted in Basic Documents
Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OAS/Ser.L/V/I.4 Rev. 9 (2003); 43 AJIL Supp. 133,
(1949)[hereinafter American Declaration].
62 Organisation of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. T.S. No. 36;
1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention].
63 Nigel Bankes, International Human Rights Law and Natural Resources Projects within the Traditional
Territories of Indigenous Peoples, 47 ALBERTA L. REV. 457, 479 (2009); Basic Document Pertaining to Human
Rights in the Inter-American System: Introduction, INTER-AM. COMM’N H.R,
http://www.cidh.oas.org/basicos/english/Basic1.%20Intro.htm.
64 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgement Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, (August 31, 2001) [hereinafter Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua].
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effective system through which indigenous peoples’ lands could be delimited, demarcated, and
titled.65 The Court used an evolutionary interpretation of international human rights instruments
to determine that the right to property includes the communal property of indigenous
communities.66 This was the first internationally binding ruling that recognised the collective
property rights of indigenous peoples and is the basis of the Inter-American judicial framework
for the land and resource rights of indigenous peoples within the Americas.67
¶21
The Court ordered Nicaragua to adopt the necessary domestic legal measures to “create an
effective mechanism for delimitation, demarcation, and titling of the property of indigenous
communities, in accordance with their customary laws, values and mores.”68 The Court also
ruled that until the delimitation and titling of the Awas Tingni community’s land, the State itself
must prevent agents of the State or third parties from acting in a way that affects the Awas
Tingni community members’ use, value, or enjoyment of the property where they live and carry
out their activities.69 It is argued that this ruling affirmed the right of indigenous peoples to their
lands and resources without State interference, and also asserted the positive obligation of the
State to prevent interference by third parties.70
¶22
The case of Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States was brought before the Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights71 and built upon the Court’s decision in Awas Tingni. The Danns,
members of the Western Shoshone Nation, argued that they had never extinguished their rights
to lands that had traditionally been used for cattle grazing and other activities.72 The United
States argued that the Western Shoshone traditional land rights had been extinguished through
legal and administrative procedures, and that this was a legal dispute, not an issue of human
rights violations.73 However, the Commission found that the United States had violated the
Danns’ right to equality under the law, the right to a fair trial, and the right to property as defined
in the American Declaration.74 The Commission argued that the Declaration in this case needed
to be applied in relation to wider principles of international human rights that protect the
individual and collective interests of indigenous peoples.75 It concluded that by refusing to
accept the Danns’ legal intervention, as members of the Western Shoshone Nation, the State had
failed to “fulfil its particular obligation to ensure that the status of the Western Shoshone
traditional lands was determined through a process of informed and mutual consent on the part of
the Western Shoshone people as a whole.”76 This interpretation by the Commission recognises
that any determination with regard to indigenous land rights must “be based on fully informed
consent of the whole community, meaning that all members be fully informed and have the
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chance to participate.”77 Ultimately, the State must ensure special measures exist to recognise
the collective interests of indigenous peoples with regard to their land and resources.78
In the case of Maya Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize, the Commission built on
its decision in the Dann case and the precedent set by the Court in the Awas Tingni case. This
case dealt with resource concessions granted to foreign companies by Belize within lands that
traditionally belonged to and were used by the Maya Communities.79 The Commission found
that the State had violated the Maya Communities’ property rights, first by not fully and
effectively delimiting, demarcating, and recognising the communal lands that had traditionally
been occupied and used by the Maya Communities.80 Further, Belize violated these property
rights by granting the concessions within the lands “without effective consultations with and the
informed consent of the Maya people.”81 Ultimately, the Commission held in this case “that the
duty to consult is a fundamental component of the States obligations in giving effect to the
communal property rights of the Maya people in the lands that they have traditionally used and
occupied.”82 With this ruling, the Commission articulated that in order to protect the communal
property rights of indigenous peoples, consultation with the goal of obtaining consent is
required.83
The case of Saramaka People v. Suriname84 is the most recent binding decision of the
Inter-American Court and also the one that most clearly articulates not only the right of
indigenous peoples to FPIC, but also the substantive nature of that right within the InterAmerican System. The Saramaka case revolves around the fact that Suriname granted resource
concessions to private companies within the territories of the Saramaka People without their
consultation or consent. The Court found that Suriname had violated the Saramaka People’s
rights, as tribal peoples, to judicial protection and property by granting the logging and mining
concessions, and failing to have effective mechanisms to protect them from acts that violate their
rights to property as defined in the American Convention.85
However, the Court held that the property rights of the American Convention are not
absolute and that States have the right to subordinate property rights in the interests of society.86
The Court stated that “a State may restrict the use and enjoyment of the right to property where
the restrictions are: a) previously established by law; b) necessary; c) proportional, and d) with
the aim of achieving a legitimate objective in a democratic society.”87
The Court, however, also placed limits on a State’s authority to subordinate the rights of
indigenous peoples, ruling that such restrictions must not violate the right of indigenous peoples
to survival.88 In order to ensure this protection, the Court prescribed a series of safeguards
which require States to: ensure effective participation of the affected people in the decision;
guarantee that the affected peoples will receive a reasonable benefit from such a plan; and ensure
77
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that prior to granting any concession, independent and technically sound environmental and
social impact assessments be undertaken to mitigate any negative effects.89 The first safeguard
calls for the effective participation of the affected people in line with their customs and traditions
regarding any development or investment plan within their territory.90 The Court further defines
this State obligation as including the State’s duty to disseminate and receive information, and
specifies that consultations must be in good faith, be culturally appropriate, and have the intent
of reaching an agreement.91 In the case of large-scale developments that could impact the
survival of a people, the State has the duty not only to consult, but also to obtain free, prior, and
informed consent.92
¶27
The Saramaka case clearly sets a precedent within the Inter-American System.93 The
Court has recognized indigenous peoples’ right to consultation with regard to any developments
within their lands and territories, and requires FPIC with regard to large-scale development
projects. This can be considered a step forward in the enforcement of indigenous peoples’ rights
at the international level.94 However, there is still some concern, in that placing restrictions on
indigenous peoples’ rights to their lands and resources when States deem it to be in the interests
of society is problematic.95 Especially because this, as stated earlier, has been one of the historic
reasons that States have used to justify undermining indigenous peoples’ land and resource
rights. The fact that smaller scale concessions may be granted without achieving consent is also
of concern.96
¶28
In July 2011, the Inter-American Court held hearings on the case of Kichwa People of
Sarayaku v. Ecuador.97 This case revolves around the granting of oil exploration and
exploitation licenses within the territory traditionally occupied and used by the Kichwa People of
Sarayaku.98 The Commission contends that the State of Ecuador violated the Kichwa People of
Sarayaku’s right to property (Article 21) in relation to the right to freedom of thought and
expression (Article 13), and the right to participate in government (Article 23) by failing to
effectively consult the affected communities prior to the granting of the licenses and allowing
activities within the territories of Kichwa People of Sarayaku to their detriment.99
¶29
In its application to the Court, the Inter-American Commission builds on the safeguards
developed in the Saramaka case, arguing that there is an implicit obligation to ensure prior
consultation in the safeguard requiring effective participation of indigenous peoples with regard
to any development, investment, exploration and mining on indigenous peoples lands.100 The
Commission further argues that the Court in Saramaka was unequivocal in the need to achieve
89
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consent when a project is of large enough scale to impact the survival of a people.101 The
Commission then attempts to further the development of the content and scope of the duty to
consult.102 Focusing on the right to information, the Commission states that the information
provided on the proposed project must be in clear and accessible language, and that the
information provided be sufficient and complete enough to guarantee that if consent is given, it
has been given free from manipulation.103 The information and consultations must be held
sufficiently in advance of either the granting of authorization or the initiation of any
negotiations.104 Further, if full consent is not determined to be required, then within the terms of
the consultation there should be a time when the communities can know why their arguments
were overridden and be provided adequate information about compensation and reparations.105
Ultimately, the Commission argues that the right to prior consultation “implies the right to play a
real role in the decision-making process.”106 Depending on the Court’s ruling in this case, there
is potential to expand and reinforce the safeguards developed in the Saramaka case and further
develop the content and scope of the right to free, prior, and informed consultations within the
Inter-American system.
E. Discussion
¶30

At a minimum, international standards call for the consultation of the affected peoples
when any development project is being considered that is either within their lands and territories
or that affects traditionally used resources. The U.N. Treaty supervisory bodies have
increasingly interpreted existing conventions as requiring this minimum duty to consult
indigenous peoples when decisions are being made regarding their lands and resources. More
specifically the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and the
Committee on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights (CESCR), have increasingly recognized full
FPIC by requiring States Parties to ensure that the consultation of indigenous peoples has the
goal of reaching consent. These conclusions have largely been based around the right to culture
and the right to non-discrimination, rather than on the right of indigenous peoples to selfdetermination. Ultimately, the only textual expression of FPIC is found within the U.N.
Declaration, which specifically bases FPIC on the right to self-determination.
¶31
ILO Convention No. 169 and the subsequent interpretations by the Committee of Experts
on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) confirm the minimum
standard of indigenous peoples’ rights to consultation regarding development projects, resource
extraction, and investment projects within their traditional lands and territories. Furthermore, the
convention establishes that consultations must be undertaken in good faith and have the goal of
consent. If a project will involve the relocation of indigenous peoples, then consent is not just an
aspiration, but a requirement.
¶32
The Inter-American Human Rights system has progressively developed clear standards in
relation to indigenous peoples’ participation rights with regard to their natural resources and
lands based in property rights, and effective judicial protection. The first standard requires that
States have effective mechanisms to delimit, demarcate and title indigenous peoples’ lands and
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territories as initially defined in the Awas Tingni case. The second standard is that any changes
to the title of indigenous peoples’ lands cannot occur without the consent of the entire
community affected. The third standard is clearly outlined within the safeguards articulated in
the Saramaka case, whereby indigenous peoples have the right to be consulted with relation to
any development project that is to be undertaken within their lands and territories, and,
moreover, FPIC is required if the project is large enough to have a profound impact on the
survival of the affected peoples.
¶33
Much of the development of the right to consultation and consent has been developed
within the Americas, given the role of the Inter-American Human Rights system and the fact that
most signatories to ILO Convention No. 169 are found in Latin America. However, there are
also interesting developments in other parts of the world. For example, a communication filed
with the African Commission of Human Rights on behalf of the Ogoni People of the Niger Delta
found that in order to comply with the spirit of Articles 16 and 24 of the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights,107 referring respectively to the rights to health and a clean
environment, a State is required to undertake scientifically and technically sound environmental
and social impact assessments, publicise these results, and provide meaningful opportunities for
the affected peoples to be heard and participate in the decision making process.108 Most recently,
a government investigation in India found that the granting of licenses to a mining project
violated the rights of the affected indigenous peoples’ right to FPIC, as articulated in India’s
Forest Rights Act.109
¶34
Ultimately, for a more complete analysis of the right to FPIC of indigenous peoples as a
customary international legal norm, there is a need to examine State practice beyond the
ratification or endorsement of international agreements. A customary international legal norm or
principle “is created and sustained by the constant and uniform practice of States and other
subjects of international law in or impinging upon their international legal relations, in
circumstances which give rise to legitimate expectations of similar conduct in the future.”110
¶35
The practice of States includes not just the practice of the executive branch, but the
legislative and judicial organs as well.111 What the above discussion demonstrates is that there is
a minimal consensus amongst treaty supervisory bodies that the major international human rights
treaties implicitly recognise a right to consultation in good faith. Further, in one regional human
rights system, consultation is required with regard to any development project, and ultimately
consent must be given if a project will impact the survival of a people. These might not yet
represent a customary international legal principle, but they are contributing to the development
of such a norm by slowly shaping and challenging State practice.
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III. CASE OF THE LUBICON CREE OF NORTHERN ALBERTA

¶36

The Lubicon Cree112 are a First Nation of about 500 people who have an on-going land
dispute with the government of Canada with regard to an expanse of territory of about 10,000
square kilometres in Northern Alberta.113 In 1984, Chief Bernard Ominayak of the Lubicon
Lake Band filed a communication with the Human Rights Committee (HRC) alleging that the
Canadian government had violated their right as a people to self-determination as defined in
Article 1 of the ICCPR (Ominayak v. Canada).114 The case dealt with the land dispute between
the Lubicon and the federal government of Canada, as well as the exploration and exploitation of
energy resources, such as oil and gas, within the disputed territory.115 Due to a dispute over the
facts between the parties in the case, the HRC did not publish its views until 1990.116 The HRC
found that a violation of Article 1 of the ICCPR could not be found given that as an individual,
Chief Ominayak could not file a complaint on behalf of a collective.117 Instead, the HRC
published its findings based on Article 27, stating that “[h]istorical inequities, to which the State
Party refers, and certain more recent developments threaten the way of life and culture of the
Lubicon Lake Band, and constitute a violation of Article 27 so long as they continue.”118 The
HRC agreed that a negotiated settlement would be an appropriate remedy; to date, however, the
Lubicon Cree do not have a land claim agreement and oil and gas exploitation within their
territories has continued. This case study will examine the history of the Lubicon Cree’s
attempts to have their land rights recognised, and will ultimately explore how this lack of
recognition has impacted the rights of the Lubicon to be consulted with regard to oil and gas
exploration and exploitation within their lands.
A. History

¶37

In Canada there are several bases for proven or claimed Aboriginal land rights: historic
treaties; modern day comprehensive land claims; certain Aboriginal rights to participate in
traditional activities, such as hunting, trapping or fishing, which may exist without a signed
treaty; and Aboriginal title which arises from the proven historic use and occupancy of land.119
Unlike earlier treaties, which were negotiated with individual First Nations, the Numbered
Treaties or Post-Confederation Treaties covered large expanses of land which involved many,
potentially unrelated First Nations communities, and negotiations did not bring all of the
concerned nations together at one location.120 What instead occurred was a process of adhesion
which:
112
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“allowed a band that had not participated in the negotiations to join or adhere
afterwards to a treaty. They would join as a group, with the chief and headmen
signing the treaty, just as if they had been present at the first signing, expect that
the terms were now fixed and not subject to further negotiation.”121
¶38

The Canadian governmental authorities see all of the Numbered Treaties as having
extinguished Aboriginal title to the entire expanses of lands within the territories identified; in
their view, the bands “that signed each treaty surrendered, not unique homelands within the
treaty area, but their right to use the entire area.”122 This is where the point of original contention
lies for the Lubicon in that, as a separate nation, they never adhered to a treaty and thus never
ceded their land rights.123
¶39
In 1899, Treaty No. 8 was negotiated and signed between a treaty commission and two
Cree Chiefs representing the Cree people who were present at the negotiations.124 The treaty
covers 324,900 square miles in northern parts of British Colombia, Alberta, and Saskatchewan,
and part of the Northwest Territories.125 In the early 1900s, a series of adhesions were
incorporated into Treaty No. 8, including the adhesion of a band at Whitefish Lake.126 During
this period, various individuals were added to band lists of communities to which they did not
necessarily belong.127 For example, instead of adhering a separate Lubicon Lake band, the
Indian Agents at the time added individuals from the Lubicon Lake Nation to the band list of the
Whitefish Lake Band.128 Until the 1930s, no action was taken to address the separate identity
and outstanding land entitlements of these Aboriginal communities.129
¶40
In 1933, several Lubicon men petitioned the federal government to have a reserve
established at Lubicon Lake.130 In 1940, the Lubicon Lake Band was given permission to elect a
Chief, but by this time the federal government had transferred control of these lands to the
province of Alberta under the Alberta Natural Resources Act of 1930 and it was too late for the
federal government to simply allocate a reserve.131 Instead, the federal government would have
to request land from the province, and needed to undertake a land survey.132 The federal
government sent an Indian Agent with a surveyor to Lubicon Lake and they selected an
approximate location for the reserve of about twenty-five square miles. However, the official
survey was never completed and the land was never transferred back from the province to the
federal government.133 In 1953, the Province of Alberta issued an ultimatum to the federal
government, giving the federal government thirty days to come to a final determination regarding
121
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the Lubicon Lake reserve. The federal government did not act, which resulted in the Lubicon
Lake reserve being removed from Alberta’s records, and the area was opened up for oil
exploration.134
¶41
The Lubicon continued to live on and use these territories to hunt, trap and fish as they had
traditionally done. In the early 1970s, the growth of oil and gas exploitation in northern Alberta
caused the Lubicon Cree and other Aboriginal communities, who had also been left out of Treaty
No. 8, to form a coalition called the Alberta Isolated Communities.135 In 1975, this group
attempted to file a caveat with the Registrar of the Alberta Land Registration District “which
would give notice to all parties dealing with the caveated land of their assertion of aboriginal
title, a procedure foreseen in the Provincial Land Title Act.”136 The registrar refused the caveat
and forced the communities to take legal action,137 first pursuing domestic relief and finally
initiating a case before the Human Rights Commission when domestic efforts were unsuccessful.
The ruling of the provincial Court was postponed, and during this time the Alberta government
passed the amendments to the Land Titles Act, which precluded the right to file caveats and was
retroactive to January 1975.138 The Alberta Isolated Communities’ request to file a caveat was
then dismissed by the Court in 1977.139
¶42
In 1982, the Lubicon attempted to get an injunction to temporarily halt activities of oil and
gas companies operating within a nine hundred square mile radius of claimed reserve land and to
reduce activity in a further 8,500 square miles of land traditionally used for hunting and
trapping.140 The application for the injunction asserted that the Lubicon had never ceded their
land rights and the continuation of the activities of the oil and gas companies would cause
“irreparable harm to their traditional way of life, in particular, of hunting and trapping.”141 The
application for the injunction was dismissed in 1983, when the Court ruled that the balance of
convenience was in favour of the oil companies, and that they would suffer substantial losses if
the injunction was granted.142 Ultimately, the judge did not agree with the Lubicon argument
that the activities of the oil companies in question would cause irreparable harm to their culture
and stated that:
[t]he twentieth century, for better or for worse, has been part of the applicants’
lives for a considerable period of time. The influence of the outside world comes
from various sources, in many cases not connected with any of the activities of
any of the respondents.143
¶43

The Lubicon Lake Band appealed to the Alberta Court of Appeals, but in 1985 this Court
upheld the ruling.144 The Supreme Court of Canada further refused leave to appeal.145
134
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¶44

It was during this period of time in 1984 that the Lubicon had filed their communication
with the HRC. In 1988, frustrated by the lack of response in the legal system, the Lubicon set up
roadblocks and forced the provincial government into negotiations for a land agreement.146 The
result was an agreement in which the provincial government would transfer ninety-five miles of
land to the federal government in order to set up a reserve.147 This agreement has never been
implemented.148 In 1990, the HRC published its opinion regarding Ominayak v. Canada, and the
Canadian government committed to negotiating a land claim settlement with the Lubicon. Three
rounds of negotiations have occurred since this time: first in 1992, then 1998, and most recently
in 2003.149 The points of contention in the negotiations appear to be the Lubicon’s desire to
include both compensation for past harms and the right to self-government within a binding legal
agreement.150
¶45
Between 1979 and 1982, four hundred oil wells had been drilled within the traditional
territories of the Lubicon.151 By 2002, the number of wells had grown to 1,700,152 and as of
2010, there have been over 2,600 wells drilled.153 The wells are spread over approximately
seventy percent of the disputed territory.154 Given the fact that the provincial and federal
governments have yet to recognise the Lubicon land claim, many of these wells have been
developed without any consultation by the provincial government with the Lubicon.155 In some
cases, individual companies have consulted directly, but ultimately the Lubicon Cree have
limited recourse if they do not consent to the proposed projects.156
B. Canada’s Human Rights and Legal Obligations
¶46

Canada has ratified or acceded to many of the major international human rights treaties.
These treaties importantly include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR)157 and its first optional protocol,158 the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR ),159 and the International Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).160 Although none of these treaties include a textual
expression regarding the right of indigenous peoples to be consulted or to FPIC, the
interpretations of the supervisory bodies of these treaties create a minimum obligation to consult
with Aboriginal peoples in good faith.161
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¶47

Canada is not a signatory to the American Convention, but both the Inter-American Court
and Commission consider the American Declaration a representation of the human rights
provisions in the Organization of American States (OAS) Charter. As such, the Court and
Commission consider the Declaration binding on all OAS member states, including Canada.162
The Inter-American Commission has held that in order to fully respect and comply with Article
XXIII (the right to property) of the American Declaration, there appears to be a minimum
standard that requires States Parties to consult with indigenous peoples regarding any
development within their traditionally used and occupied territories or lands.163
¶48
In order to effectively analyze the Lubicon Lake Band’s rights to consultation and consent,
it is also worth understanding what Canadian legal standards are being developed with regard to
Aboriginal peoples participation rights. Since the initial cases brought by the Lubicon in the
Canadian courts, there has been extensive development in terms of the duty to consult. In the
last ten years, three cases have been decided by the Supreme Court of Canada which have set the
standard for the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate Aboriginal peoples: Haida Nation v.
British Columbia, Taku River First Nation v. British Columbia, and Mikisew Cree First Nations
v. Canada.164 These three decisions define the duty to consult as flowing from the honor of the
Crown (Canadian government) and affirm that this duty exists whenever there is knowledge of
the potential existence of an Aboriginal right or title.165 The duty falls to the Crown and not the
project proponents.166 The Supreme Court of Canada defines the scope of the duty to consult as
relative to the existing claim to the Aboriginal title or right and the degree of the expected
impact.167 This means that the duty depends on the strength of the claim to title or to the right,
the degree of significance of the right itself, and the degree of potential infringement on the
right.168
¶49
It is important to note that within Canadian domestic legal jurisprudence, the participation
rights of Aboriginal Canadians do not appear to flow from international human rights
obligations,169 but rather from the honour of the Crown. This duty to consult, although it can
contribute to the development of State practice in terms of indigenous peoples participation
rights, is not the equivalent of the more substantive right to FPIC recognized in international law.
Furthermore, domestic standards do not remove Canada’s international human rights legal
obligations with regard to the consultation of Aboriginal peoples. The relevant question
becomes whether Canadian standards meet the developing norms in international human rights
jurisprudence, and in particular whether the Canadian and provincial governments have violated
the Lubicon Lake Band’s rights to consultation or consent under international norms which apply
to the Canadian government.
162
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The Canadian government has refused to ratify ILO Convention No. 169, and until
recently it refused to endorse the U.N. Declaration,170 both of which contain the clearest textual
expressions of FPIC. At a minimum, however, the Canadian government and its provincial
counterparts do appear to have a duty to engage in good faith consultations regarding any
development or investment project within their territories or that affects resources that have been
traditionally used. This is the norm that appears to be developing in the treaty bodies that
Canada has ratified, within the Inter-American Commission’s interpretations of the American
Declaration which apply to Canada as a member of the OAS, and even within Canada’s own
domestic jurisprudence.
C. Discussion

¶51

In its original decision in Ominayak v. Canada, the HRC stated that both historical
inequalities and recent developments were threatening the way of life and culture of the Lubicon
Cree, and constituted a violation of Article 27 of the ICCPR.171 There was no mention of the
right to consultation, although the initial communication submitted by the Lubicon was based
upon their right to self-determination and included their right to dispense of their natural
resources. The decision is actually considered to be quite vague given that it does not further
articulate the recent developments or historical inequalities to which it is referring.172 The
Human Rights Committee (HRC) simply found a general violation of Article 27. However,
since this decision, the HRC has continued to expand on its interpretation of this Article. In
particular, it is clear that the HRC takes the view that ethnic, linguistic, or religious minorities
have the right to participate in decisions that affect them,173 and has applied this standard with
particular reference to the rights of indigenous peoples. Referring to its original decision, in
2006 the HRC drew the Canadian government’s attention to the fact that the negotiations with
the Lubicon Lake Band had reached an impasse and called for a resumption of such
negotiations.174 It further called on the Canadian government to consult the Lubicon people with
regard to any exploitation of resources within the disputed land as part of its obligations in
applying the ICCPR.175
¶52
Other U.N. bodies and special procedures have also called attention to the case of the
Lubicon Cree, referring both to the failed negotiations regarding the land claim agreement and
the need to consult with the Lubicon prior to any resource exploration or exploitation. For
example, in 2006 the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) called upon
the Canadian government to re-enter into negotiations with the Lubicon and consult with them
regarding developments within the disputed territories.176 In 2008, the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) issued an early warning communication to
Canada, highlighting its concerns regarding the unsettled land claim, and in particular the
170 Press Release, Canada Endorses the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Department
of Northern and Indian Affairs, Government of Canada (Nov. 12, 2010).
171 Ominayak v. Canada, supra 113, ¶ 33.
172 Bankes, supra note 63, at 467-69.
173 CESCR, supra note 15; CESCR, General comment No. 21 Right of everyone to take part in cultural life, supra
note 16, ¶ 36.
174 HRC, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Canada, ¶ 9, UN Doc. CCPR/C/CAN/CO/5
(Apr. 20, 2006).
175 Id. ¶ 9.
176 CESCR, Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Canada, ¶ 38
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proposal to develop a pipeline that would run through the disputed land without full
consultations of the Lubicon people.177 In 2009, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate
Housing visited the Lubicon Lake Band and in her final recommendations called for a
moratorium on all activities in the disputed land until a settlement is reached and consultations
can be undertaken regarding all activities within the disputed territory, regardless of the status of
the land claim.178
¶53
The Canadian government has consistently responded to these recommendations by stating
that it has attempted to negotiate a settlement with the Lubicon on various occasions and that the
provincial government has halted all activities within the proposed reserve land. The government
further asserts, with regard to new large-scale pipelines, that the Lubicon had been given access
to present their case at the appropriate regulatory proceedings.179 However, what appears to be
consistent in these observations is that regardless of whether a settled land claim exists or not,
the provincial and federal government have the duty to ensure that the Lubicon are consulted
with regard to any developments within the disputed territory, not merely the lands earmarked
for a reserve. This is important given that the Canadian governments’ position does not
recognise the larger area of land traditionally used by the Lubicon Cree for hunting and trapping.
There does not appear to be clarity in the U.N. System in terms of the scope of the duty to
consult and how it should be implemented; thus, whether merely giving the Lubicon or other
First Nations standing with regulatory and licensing bodies will satisfy the duty to consult is of
debate. It would appear that Canada has continued to violate the Lubicon Lake Band’s rights to
culture as articulated in Article 27 of the ICCPR and Article 15 of the ICESCR by not settling
the land claim issue. Furthermore, there appears to be an on-going violation of these provisions
of the ICCPR and the ICESCR due to Canada’s failure to ensure that the Lubicon are consulted
with regard to developments within the disputed territories.
¶54
In the case of the Lubicon Lake Band, it would appear that Canada has failed to fulfill the
minimum standards developed by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. These
norms dictate first that there cannot be any change in title to indigenous peoples’ lands without
the consent of the entire community affected and that the State must consult with the Lubicon
regarding any development within the lands and territories that they have traditionally occupied
and used. Not doing so could be a violation of the right to equality under the law (Article II), the
right to culture (Article XIII), the right to a fair trial (Article XVIII), and the right to property
(Article XXIII), as articulated in the American Declaration and as applied by the Commission.
¶55
First, there are parallels with the Mary and Carrie Dann case, in which the Inter-American
Commission found that no change to indigenous peoples’ land title can be made without the
consent of the entire indigenous community.180 When looking at the interpretation and
application of Treaty No. 8 and the process of adhesion, it is clear that as a collective the
Lubicon never signed the treaty. Even if other Cree leaders and nations signed or adhered to the
treaty, within the Inter-American Commission’s interpretation of the property rights of
indigenous peoples this does not mean that the Lubicon as a people ever extinguished their title
177
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to the lands that they had both historically occupied and used. Therefore the Canadian
government could be found to have violated the collective property rights of the Lubicon Cree.
Further, the granting of concessions within the lands traditionally used and occupied by the
Lubicon without prior and informed consultation, would be considered a further violation of
these property rights as determined in the Maya Communities v. Belize case.181 Again, the
standard appears not to be limited to a small reserve area, but to the lands traditionally occupied
and used by the Lubicon.182
¶56
Although the Inter-American Court does not have jurisdiction over Canada, the Lubicon
case could be used to assess the effectiveness of the safeguards as developed in the case of
Saramaka People v. Suriname,183 with regard to what standard is being used to determine
whether a development project is of a small- or large-scale, and what determines whether such
developments will have an impact on the survival of a people. The 10,000 square kilometres
over which the Lubicon claim title is covered in large numbers of wells and oil extraction
infrastructure, but there has never been a public proposal for a single large-scale project. Rather,
it is the cumulative impacts of the wells that have caused the Lubicon to argue that their survival
and the survival of their culture have been at risk for decades.
¶57
With regard to the duty to consult Aboriginal peoples as articulated in Canadian
jurisprudence, the Lubicon case is also evocative. There is clearly a relationship within
Canadian law between the duty to consult and an existing, proven or unproven, Aboriginal right
or land title.184 This means that even with the lack of a negotiated settlement with regard to the
land claim, the provincial and federal governments are required to ensure that the Lubicon are
consulted with regard to developments within both the reserve land and the larger area of land
traditionally used for subsistence hunting and trapping.
¶58
Ultimately, even with the ongoing land dispute, consultation in good faith is required by
Canada’s international human rights obligations with regard to developments within both the
designated reserve land and the lands which the Lubicon have historically occupied and used for
hunting and trapping. The question as to whether full consent could be required depends on
whether the Inter-American Commission will begin to apply the safeguards test in its
interpretation of the American Declaration and how the Commission determines whether a
project is of a large enough scale that it could impact the survival of a people. Ultimately, there
is still potential to infringe upon the Lubicon Cree’s rights to property, culture, judicial
protection, and ultimately self-determination with regard to the standards concerning whether a
project is considered small or large scale. This implies that consultations need to be held at the
moment that a State is considering opening up certain lands for resource exploration, as well as
ongoing consultations, not just in terms of individual small projects or individual well licenses,
but also in terms of addressing the cumulative impact of such developments.
IV. CASE OF THE MAYAN COMMUNITIES OF SIPACAPA AND SAN MIGUEL IXTAHUACAN
¶59

The municipalities of San Miguel Ixtahuacan and Sipacapa are located in the western
highlands of Guatemala and are the site of the Marlin Mine. Both communities are composed of
a largely indigenous population: in San Miguel Ixtahuacan ninety-eight percent of the population
181
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identify as Maya-Mam, and Sipacapa’s population is seventy-seven percent MayaSipacapense.185 The mine occupies about five square kilometres with eighty-seven percent of the
full twenty square kilometre concession lying within San Miguel Ixtahuacan and thirteen percent
found within Sipacapa.186 The Marlin Mine consists of two open-pit mines, an underground
mine, and a mill, plant, and tailings storage facilities.187 Both a gold and silver mine uses openpit and underground mining methods to extract the ore, followed by a cyanide vat leaching
process.188 The mine is one hundred percent owned by Montana Exploradora Ltd. (Montana),
which is a privately held company under Guatemalan law.189 As of 2006, Montana was a wholly
owned subsidiary of Goldcorp Inc., which is a Canadian-based mining company.190
¶60
The mining project has been the focus of an intense national and international debate with
regard to indigenous peoples’ rights not only to consultation, but also to FPIC with regard to
development projects. The people of both Sipacapa and San Miguel Ixtahuacan have challenged
the presence of the mine within their lands by raising concerns with regard to health and other
environmental impacts of the exploitation process, and by contesting the fact that the
Guatemalan government never fully consulted with the affected communities before granting
either the exploration or exploitation licenses. This case study will examine the development of
the Marlin Mine, the opposition to the mine project, and the attempts of the people of Sipacapa
and San Miguel Ixtahuacan to have their rights respected.
A. History
¶61

In 1997, one year after the signing of the Guatemalan Peace Accords, the Guatemalan
government passed Legislative Decree 48-97, known as the Mining Law.191 The new law
reduced the percentage of royalties that mining companies are required to pay the Guatemalan
government from six to one percent, abolished limits on foreign ownership of mines, and granted
mining operations duty free imports.192 The following year, a group of geologists discovered the
Marlin mineral deposit and in 1999 Montana was granted an exploration license.193 It was in
2002 that Montana first began purchasing land from individual landowners; the land purchases
continued up until 2005 and consisted of the purchase of 395 parcels of land from 254 different
land owners.194 According to the company records, it was also during this period that Montana
began holding community meetings with a total of thirty meetings in San Miguel Ixtahuacan and
seventeen in Sipacapa between June and September 2003.195 However, no details about the
185 FREDEMI & The Center for International Environmental Law, Specific Instance Complaint Submitted to the
Canadian National Contact Point Pursuant to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises Concerning: The
Operations of Goldcorp Inc. at the Marlin Mine in the Indigenou Community of San Miguel Ixtahuacán,
Guatemala, 4-5 (2009).
186 Id. at 4.
187 CAO, Assessment of a Complaint Submitted to CAO in Relation to the Marlin Mining Project in Guatemala, 12
(2005).
188 William N. Holden & R. Daniel Jacobson, Civil Society Opposition to Nonferrous Metals Mining in Guatemala,
19 VOLUNTAS 325, 330 (2008).
189 ON COMMON GROUND CONSULTANTS INC., HUMAN RIGHTS ASSESSMENT OF GOLDCORP’S MARLIN MINE 34
(2010).
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191 Holden and Jacobson, supra note 188, at 329.
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contents of the meetings were recorded.196 In September 2003, Montana asked municipal
officials in both Sipacapa and San Miguel Ixtahuacan to submit signed letters in support of the
mine.197 This process was considered to be quite controversial in Sipacapa, but the letters of
support were eventually submitted with the required environmental impact assessment (EIA) in
Montana’s application for an exploitation license.198 The Ministry of Energy and Mines granted
Montana a twenty-five year exploitation license and further exploration licenses in the region in
the last quarter of 2003.199
¶62
In 2004, the construction of the Marlin Mine began and the project received a $45 million
loan from the International Finance Corporation.200 It was this same year that opposition grew
against the mine within the affected communities; as early as February 2004 protests were held
in Sipacapa.201 The first recorded meeting between the Ministry of Energy and Mines and the
local communities took place around the same time in early 2004, when the vice-minister
traveled to both Sipacapa and San Miguel Ixtahuacan.202 In January 2005, the Municipal
Council of Sipacapa passed a resolution to hold a consulta de buena fe (consultation or
community referendum) regarding the Marlin Mine.203 Only a few days before the consultation
was to be held, Montana brought an injunction and the Municipal government of Sipacapa was
blocked from hosting the consultation.204 Instead, the Catholic Church and several local nongovernmental organizations assumed responsibility for organizing the referendum.205 On June
18, 2005, the thirteen villages that compose the municipality of Sipacapa participated.206 The
referendum resulted in eleven communities rejecting the mine, one community voting in favour
of the mine, and another community abstaining from the referendum.207 Of the approximately
2,500 voters who participated, ninety-eight percent voted against the mine.208 The government
and Montana challenged the legality of the consultation, and the Guatemalan government
eventually took the case to the Constitutional Court.
¶63
In 2005, the first of several international investigations into the actions of both Montana
and the Guatemalan government was undertaken by the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman of the
International Finance Corporation. The Compliance Advisor Ombudsman eventually determined
that the consultation processes employed by the company, while not necessarily meaningful or
culturally appropriate, were adequate under International Finance Corporation guidelines.209
Ultimately, the assessment determined that it did not expect Sipacapa to be significantly
environmentally impacted by the mine and simply called for dialogue between the community
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and the mining company.210 Surrounded by conflict and despite the opposition of Sipacapa, the
mine went into production in late 2005.211
In 2006, a national union federation, UNSITRAGUA, filed a communication with the
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) of
the International Labour Organization (ILO) arguing that the government had failed to undertake
consultations with the people of both Sipacapa and San Miguel Ixtahuacan and raising concerns
over the potential environmental impacts of the mine.212 In its observation issued in response to
the complaint, the CEACR noted that the Guatemalan government did not contest that it had
never consulted with the affected communities prior to the granting of licenses and called on the
Guatemalan government to undertake such consultations.213
In 2007, the Constitutional Court of Guatemala ruled with regard to the referendum in
Sipacapa.214 The Court determined that although the referendum in Sipacapa itself was legal, the
results were not binding.215 The Court found that a referendum held by the municipal
government could not be binding over the national government or over matters under the
jurisdiction of other government agencies, in this case the Ministry of Energy and Mines.216 The
case has since been brought before the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights.217
In 2008, a group of Goldcorp shareholders traveled to Guatemala to meet with community
members and investigate the human rights claims, and as a result Goldcorp commissioned a
human rights impact assessment (HRIA), which was published in May 2010.218 On December 9,
2009, the Front in Defense of San Miguel Ixtahuacán (“FREDEMI”) filed a specific instance
complaint with the Canadian National Contact Point of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.219 Given that
Guatemala is not a member of the OECD, this complaint was filed in Canada, but Montana is a
wholly owned subsidiary of Goldcorp, whose headquarters are located in Canada and whose
stocks are traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange.220 The complaint states that Goldcorp’s
operations at the Marlin Mine “are not consistent with Guatemala’s obligations to respect the
complainants’ rights to life, health, water, property, to be free from racial discrimination, and to
free, prior, and informed consent.”221 This case has yet to be resolved.
The Marlin Mine completed its first year of production in 2006 and “is expected to yield
approximately 250,000 ounces of gold and 3.6 million ounces of silver a year until its anticipated
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completion date in 2015.”222 Montana has paid approximately $5.8 million dollars in royalties
with equal amounts going to the Guatemalan government and the municipality of San Miguel
Ixtahuacan.223 To date, the municipality of Sipacapa has refused to accept a reserve fund that has
been set aside by the company.224 It should be noted that two men have been killed in connection
with this process, one during a protest against the mine in January 2005,225 and one two months
before the referendum in Sipacapa.226 That same year, a credible plot to assassinate Bishop
Alvaro Ramazzini, a vocal opponent to the mine, was discovered.227 Furthermore, threats and
harassment have been reported by community members and opponents to the mining project,
including death threats as well as the criminalization of protests.228
¶68
On May 20, 2010, the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights granted
precautionary measures for eighteen communities in Sipacapa and San Miguel Ixtahuacan with
regard to the Marlin Mine.229 The measures called on the state of Guatemala to suspend the
mining license of the Marlin Project, implement measures to prevent environmental
contamination, and provide protection to the members of the eighteen communities until the
Commission publishes a decision on the merits of the case.230 On June 23, 2010, the President of
Guatemala publicly issued the temporary suspension of the mining license after studying the
precautionary measures.231 Further, on July 21, 2010, the Ministry of Energy and Mines was
officially notified by the Attorney General of Guatemala to begin the administrative processes
required to temporarily suspend operations at the mine,232 but as of the publishing of this article
the mine continues to operate.
B. Guatemala’s Human Rights and Legal Obligations
¶69

Guatemala has ratified or acceded to many of the major international human rights treaties.
In particular, Guatemala is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR)233 and its first optional protocol,234 the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),235 and the International Convention on the Elimination of All
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Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).236 Again, these treaties do not include any textual
expressions with regard to the right to FPIC of indigenous peoples, but the supervisory bodies
have interpreted a minimal obligation to consult with indigenous peoples in good faith prior to
any development project within their territories.237
¶70
Having ratified the American Convention,238 Guatemala has a binding obligation to fulfill
the standards developed within the Inter-American System by both the Commission and the
Court. These standards include the requirement to: ensure an effective system that delimits,
demarcates and titles indigenous peoples collective property;239 ensure that no changes to such
title can be made without the consent of the entire community;240 and apply the safeguards test
developed in the Saramaka People case whenever considering a development project within
indigenous peoples lands or that affects traditionally used natural resources.241 The safeguards
test specifically requires consultation with regard to any development project,242 and further
requires full consent if the project is of a large enough scale that it could impact the survival of a
people.243
¶71
With specific regard to the rights of indigenous peoples, Guatemala has both ratified ILO
Convention No. 169244 and endorsed the U.N. Declaration.245 Article 15 of ILO Convention No.
169 clearly calls for consultation prior to exploration or exploitation of natural resources within
the territories of indigenous peoples. The standards for consultations are articulated in both
Articles Six and Seven of the ILO Convention, which call for consultations to be in good faith, to
be appropriate to the situation, and to have the goal of reaching agreement or consent.246
Although not a legally binding document, the U.N. Declaration calls for FPIC of indigenous
peoples with regard to any development projects that affects their lands, territories or other
resources.247
¶72
With regard to its domestic law, Guatemala’s legal obligations to consult with or achieve
consent of indigenous peoples are less clear. As part of the 1996 Peace Accords, which ended 36
years of internal armed conflict, the Guatemalan government negotiated the Agreement on the
Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which “committed the Guatemalan state to implement
a series of constitutional reforms recognising indigenous peoples’ collective rights.”248 “These
included the right to be subject to customary indigenous law, the right to bilingual education, and
protections for communally held land.”249 However, during a referendum in 1999, the proposed
reforms were rejected and as a result the legal protection of indigenous rights within Guatemalan
domestic law is comparatively weak.250 Furthermore, even though Guatemala ratified ILO
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Convention No. 169 in 1996, it has yet to implement domestic legislation that creates effective
mechanisms through which such consultation can take place.251 The lack of clarity with regard
to consultation in Guatemala is evident in the 2007 ruling of the Constitutional Court in Rosa
Maria Montenegro de Garoz v. Consejo Municipal de Sipacapa, which found that although
community referenda are legal and can be considered a popular expression of a community’s
view, the results are not binding.252
¶73
Guatemala may have little clarity with regard to domestic laws, but it has strong
international legal obligations with regard to the participation rights of indigenous peoples. As a
party to the American Convention and the ILO Convention No. 169, the Guatemalan State is
obligated to consult with indigenous peoples with regard to all development projects within their
territories or that could affect their resources.253 These consultations must be in good faith, be
culturally appropriate,254 take place prior to exploration and exploitation phases,255 and be fully
informed. If a project has the potential to impact the survival of a people, then the State of
Guatemala must obtain the consent of the affected people before allowing or undertaking such a
project.256
C. Discussion
¶74

There are two questions at the centre of this case. First, what constitutes meaningful
consultation? Second, whose responsibility it is to undertake such consultations? The
government of Guatemala and the mining company maintain that the affected communities were
consulted through the series of community meetings that the mining company held between 2002
and 2003. These meetings were conducted as part of the environmental impact assessment (EIA)
as required by Guatemalan law, and the government maintains that it informed the company that
it was required to undertake such public participation in order to obtain the exploitation
license.257 In addition, the company has argued that there is evidence of consent implicitly found
with the land purchases and furthermore that all of these transactions were voluntary.258 At the
same time, there is no evidence that the Guatemalan government itself undertook any type of
consultation at either the exploration phase or prior to granting the exploitation license, and only
in 2004 and 2005 did the Ministry of Energy and Mines meet with the communities of Sipacapa
and San Miguel Ixtahuacan.259
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¶75

With regard to the standards set by the U.N. treaty bodies of the ICCPR, ICESCR, and
ICERD, the Guatemalan government was required at a minimum to ensure that consultations
were undertaken and that such consultations had the intention of reaching agreement. In 2010,
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), in reference to General
Recommendation No. 23, specifically called on the Guatemalan government to ensure
consultation with the affected indigenous peoples at every stage of resource exploitation projects,
and in particular informed the State that it must obtain consent prior to undertaking any such
project.260 The Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms of Indigenous People visited Guatemala in 2010. In his preliminary observations, the
Special Rapporteur clearly stated that the government did not consult with the affected
communities prior to the issuing of exploration and exploitation licenses.261 Further, he called
attention to the Human Rights Impact Assessment (HRIA) commissioned by Goldcorp that
indicates that, given the lack of government involvement in the consultations undertaken by the
company, these consultations do not adhere to international standards.262 Although the mining
company engaged in community meetings, these do not constitute consultations and do not
absolve the Guatemalan government of its international obligations. Furthermore, it is clear that
these meetings do not meet the standards set by the U.N. Declaration, which calls for fully
informed and prior consent of the affected indigenous peoples. Given that in Goldcorp’s own
human rights impact assessment (HRIA), the company found that the communities have
continually contested the original agreements to endorse the mine, the consultations were not
adequate.263
¶76
ILO Convention No. 169 specifically requires that a State Party consult with indigenous
peoples prior to any exploration or exploitation of natural resources in their lands or territories.
Importantly, this convention was ratified by Guatemala prior to the issuing of both the
exploration and exploitation licenses for the Marlin Mine Project and, thus, the Guatemalan
government had a legally binding obligation to ensure that such consultations took place. The
ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR)
noted in 2006 that the government did not argue that it had held consultations, implying that this
obligation had been met by the mining company through the process of completing the
environmental impact assessment (EIA).264 Ultimately, the Guatemalan government failed to
meets its obligations under the ILO Convention.
¶77
The CEACR has since repeatedly called for the Guatemalan government to ensure that the
consultations take place, and to develop effective legislative machinery to implement the
Convention, such as ensuring the Mining Law is brought into line with Articles 6, 7, and 15 of
the ILO Convention.265 Additionally, the CEACR has emphasised that when using the terms
“lands” and “territories,” these are to be interpreted as the territories that affected peoples have
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traditionally occupied and used, and not simply the lands owned by individuals.266 Thus, the
argument that landowners gave their consent to sell their land does not fulfill the consultation
requirement, in particular when the lands are considered to be of a collective nature. Finally, in
2009, the CEACR emphasised that consultation of indigenous peoples with regard to natural
resources is based on the idea that they be involved in the formulation of such plans, and that any
belated consultations are not effective.267 It is clear that the Guatemalan government failed to
effectively implement the Convention, and in particular has violated the right to consultation of
the indigenous people of San Miguel Ixtahuacan and Sipacapa under Articles 6, 7, and 15 of ILO
Convention No. 169.
¶78
Within the Inter-American System, the applicable standards can be found within the
safeguards as developed in Saramaka People v. Suriname.268 It is clear that the minimum
requirement of consultation in good faith has not been met in the case of the Marlin Mine. The
company meetings do not fulfill Guatemala’s legal obligations, nor do they meet the standards of
being meaningfully or culturally appropriate. Any meetings held by the government after the
issuing of exploration and exploitation licenses fail to address the need for prior consultation.
¶79
The question as to whether full consent is required, as opposed to consultation as the goal
of an agreement, is based on how the Inter-American Commission determines when a peoples’
survival is at risk. The complaints filed by communities in both Sipacapa and San Miguel raise
concerns regarding environmental and health impacts of the mine. The Inter-American
Commission granted precautionary measures based on the claims that the mine has severely
impacted the water supply because of the presence of heavy metals in water samples, as well as
the drying up of wells and springs as a result of mining activities.269 It is important to note that
Sipacapense is a unique Mayan linguistic group.270 The determination of the existing and
potential future environmental and social impacts of the mine will need to be evaluated not just
in relation to the Mayan populations in both municipalities, but specifically with respect to the
Sipacapense people. If the survival of the Sipacapanse-Maya people is determined to be at risk
by the Inter-American Commission, it is irrelevant that only a comparatively small percentage of
the mine and concession fall within the municipality of Sipacapa. If the survival of the
Sipacapanse is at risk as a result of mining activities, then their full consent is required before
activities can continue.
¶80
Ultimately, it is clear that Guatemala has failed to uphold the minimal requirements to hold
consultations in good faith with the Mayan communities in Sipacapa and San Miguel Ixtahuacan,
and that the consultations undertaken by Montana do not meet international standards. These
meetings were held without any government involvement, are not considered to be meaningful or
culturally appropriate, and they were not held prior to the granting of the exploration license.
Interestingly, however, the community referendum held in the municipality of Sipacapa on June
18, 2005, appears to meet many of these standards. The referendum itself was conceived
through local governance processes and structures: it was the result of several Municipal Council
resolutions.271 The voting was undertaken through culturally appropriate methods with each of
266 CEACR, Individual Observation concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169)
Guatemala (ratification: 1996), ¶ 5, ILO Doc. 062007GTM169 (ILO, 2007).
267 Id. at ¶ 3.
268 Saramaka People v. Suriname, supra note 36, ¶ 133-34.
269 Inter-Am. Comm’n. H.R., PM 260-07, supra note 229.
270 CAO, supra note 186, at 4; Compliance Advisor Ombidsman, Assessment of a complaint submitted to CAO in
relation to the Marlin Mining Project in Guatemala, at 4 (2005).
271 Imai, Mehravar & Sander, supra note 57, at 116.
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the thirteen communities undertaking the vote according to their own traditions; these voting
methods ranged from blind ballots to an open vote through a show of hands.272 It is clearly
problematic that the referendum was held after the mining exploration and exploitation licenses
were issued. However, given the lack of prior consultation by the Guatemalan government, the
processes used and the results of the community referendum do appear to represent the views of
the majority of the people of Sipacapa.
V. CONCLUSION
¶81

What becomes clear in this analysis is the size of the gap between the norms being
developed within international human rights jurisprudence and State practice. If FPIC, as stated
earlier, is intended as a way to ensure meaningful engagement with indigenous peoples with
regard to their lands, territories, and resources, then stronger legally binding obligations are
required. The cases of both the Lubicon Cree and the Mayan Communities of Sipakapa and San
Miguel Ixtahuacan demonstrate that consultations cannot simply be considered administrative
procedures, but rather must be implemented with the understanding that consultations are an
expression of the right to self-determination.
¶82
In the case of the Lubicon Cree, their rights to consultation regarding oil and gas
exploitation have largely been ignored because of a land dispute with the Canadian government.
It is the failure to have their land rights recognised which has further caused their right to
consultation to be violated. The Mayan Communities of Guatemala have clearly articulated their
struggle against the Marlin Mine as a violation of their rights to both consultation and FPIC. In
this case, no significant attempt was made on the part of the Guatemalan government to
undertake consultations of any kind, nor to ensure that the mining company undertook
meaningful, informed, and culturally appropriate consultations prior to either the exploration or
exploitation of resources within the Mayan territories. The outcome in both cases is that the
Lubicon Cree and the Mayan Communities of Sipakapa and San Miguel Ixtahuacan have had
their participation rights violated. In the end, this has resulted in the ongoing exploitation of
resources within traditional territories without the collective consent of the affected indigenous
peoples.
¶83
These cases highlight the need for clear domestic legislation modeled after international
norms to implement appropriate and meaningful consultations and give adequate protection to
indigenous peoples. The cases also demonstrate the need to further develop the standards being
applied by the Inter-American System with regard to the three safeguards as developed in the
Saramaka People v. Suriname case.273 Specifically, there is a need to clarify the distinction
between small- and large-scale development projects and their potential to impact the survival of
a people. Furthermore, the Inter-American system needs to substantively define what it means
by survival.
¶84
Various conditions need to exist for the effective implementation of the right to free prior
and informed consultation or consent. Firstly, special attention must be paid to the political,
economic, and social context of a consultation process in order to ensure that it is truly free from
coercion. Secondly, for a process to be informed, all parties involved, including the State,
private industry, and the affected indigenous peoples, must have access to and share accurate
information regarding potential impacts of a project, demonstrating the need for technically
272
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accurate environmental and social impact assessments. Thirdly, all processes involved with the
consultation must be culturally appropriate, defined as ensuring that information is provided in
the appropriate language and that traditional decision-making processes are respected. Finally,
in order for any consultation to be meaningful, the concerns and potential opposition of the
affected peoples must have an impact on the final decision including the mitigation of negative
impacts and compensation for harms done, even if a full veto right is determined not to exist.
¶85
This discussion on the right to FPIC highlights the complexity of both the implementation
and significance of indigenous peoples’ participation rights. The only textual expression of full
free, prior, and informed consent is in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (U.N. Declaration),274 a non-binding instrument. The other developments
within international human rights law with regard to FPIC have been the non-binding
commentaries of U.N. Treaty bodies, such as the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights (CESCR), 275 and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial (CERD).276 The Committee
of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) in its
interpretation of ILO Convention No. 169 has argued that consultation and participation are the
cornerstones of the Convention,277 however only 20 States have ratified this convention. The
Inter-American system has some of the most substantive jurisprudence on the right to
consultation and consent, but it is regionally focused and only the rulings of the Inter-American
Court are considered binding. Ultimately, all of these developments have limited impact in
developing customary international law. However, given that international customary law is
both developed and evidenced by the practice of States,278 what these human rights instruments
and mechanisms can do is continue to challenge and guide State practice.
¶86
Although there does not appear to be an existing customary international legal principle of
the right of indigenous peoples to FPIC, there does appear to be a minimal norm developing that
requires consultation in good faith. This developing norm requires that consultations take place
prior to both the exploration and exploitation of resources within the territories of indigenous
peoples or that affect traditionally used resources. This means that consultation processes are not
intended to simply take place when issuing an exploration or exploitation license, but at the
moment a State is considering opening up an area to exploration and throughout the various
stages of resource exploitation. Within both the ILO System and the Inter-American System,
respecting the right to consultation requires that States adopt legislation in order to implement
indigenous peoples’ participation rights. Furthermore, the adoption of such legislation itself
must be in consultation with the affected indigenous peoples. Even though it is not articulated as
consent, the developing norm of consultation in good faith, if applied as a standard that requires
States to consult with indigenous peoples in such a way that the goal is to reach an agreement or
consensus, might well become a de facto obligation that ensures that indigenous peoples’ FPIC is
sought and respected.
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